Proposal threshold minimum token requirement in daos

02 September 2026

A common misconception holds that anyone holding a single governance token can create a proposal in any DAO. That is false. Almost every DAO imposes a minimum token requirement - called a proposal threshold - that must be met before a user can submit a proposal for on-chain voting.

The proposal threshold is a configurable parameter in the Governor contract that powers most on-chain DAO governance systems. It defines the minimum number of tokens a proposer must hold (or have delegated to them) at the moment of submission. If the proposer’s balance falls below this threshold after the proposal is submitted but before it goes to a vote, the proposal can be cancelled.

Real thresholds vary dramatically across major DAOs. As of data from mid-2025, the figures tell the story:

• Uniswap DAO: 2.5 million UNI tokens are required to submit a proposal. At the time that threshold was set, that amount was worth roughly $25 million USD.

• Compound DAO: The threshold is 100,000 COMP tokens, equivalent to approximately $3 million USD in mid-2025 pricing.

• MakerDAO: Proposers need 10,000 MKR tokens, which at mid-2025 rates equated to roughly $15 million USD.

• Gitcoin DAO: The threshold is 25,000 GTC tokens, worth about $1.2 million USD in the same period.

These numbers are not static. DAO governance can vote to raise or lower them. The thresholds serve a clear purpose: they prevent spam. Without a minimum requirement, an attacker with a tiny token holding could flood a DAO with thousands of meaningless proposals, overwhelming the community’s attention and clogging the voting queue.

The tradeoff is real. Low thresholds favor accessibility. Small token holders can participate directly, and new ideas from less wealthy community members get a hearing. High thresholds favor spam prevention but concentrate proposal power among the largest holders. Many DAOs wrestle with this tension constantly.

When a user attempts to submit a proposal without meeting the threshold, the Governor contract returns a clear error: Insufficient voting power to create proposal. This message is standard across OpenZeppelin and Compound-style governance contracts. The transaction simply fails.

An edge case exists that surprises many users. A proposer who meets the threshold when they submit a proposal can still see it cancelled if their token balance drops below the threshold before the proposal reaches the voting stage. This happens because Governor contracts re-check the proposer’s balance at the start of the voting period. If a proposer sells or transfers a large chunk of tokens between submission and the voting window, the contract cancels the proposal automatically. No vote occurs.

The cancellation is not reversible. The proposer must resubmit once they again hold enough tokens.

Some DAOs use delegation rather than direct holding to meet the threshold. Governance tokens delegated to the proposer’s address count toward the requirement. This means a user does not need to own the tokens personally - they can gather delegations from other holders who support their idea.

The proposal threshold is one of several parameters that shape who participates in DAO governance and how. It interacts with quorum requirements (covered elsewhere on this site) and voting power delegation (also covered elsewhere). Changing one parameter often forces adjustments to the others.

For anyone trying to participate in a DAO’s governance, checking the current proposal threshold is the first step. The figure is almost never zero. If your wallet shows the Insufficient voting power error, the DAO’s documentation or its Governor contract parameters will tell you the exact number you need.

Back to daos